As well as marking 60 years since the signature of the Treaty of Rome, 2017 will see the 10 th Presidential election of France's 5th Republic. The overlap between the question of Europe and the election to France's highest office provides the framework for this article to explore the development of the European debate in France.
Introduction
In the 60 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the European project has become a central influence on French politics and society. Despite evidence of consistent general support, there has been increasing scepticism as sacrifices and negative consequences have become inevitable (Milner 2000, 35-58) . One would therefore be forgiven for assuming that the intervening period would have witnessed an elevation of the question of Europe to a crucial election issue. However, and as will be discussed in greater detail below, 'Europe has long been absent from French national electoral contests' (Dehousse and Tacea 2015, 152) .
Whilst opposition to Europe has been mounting, the political translation of it has been reserved to marginal and extreme elements. The dominant centre-Right/centre-Left forces have shared a consensus on the fundamental advancement of the EU project (Drake 2013, 127-8) . As a result, Europe dominated by a 'rhetoric of unanimity' , has never really been an issue with enough leverage to see it brought in from the margins of successive presidential campaigns. The strange set of circumstances that has seen the increasingly important issue of Europe astutely avoided has enabled analyses of its presence in elections campaigns to be described as 'invisible mais omniprésente' (Belot and Cautrès 2004, 119-41) .
This article begins by shedding some light on how this paradoxical set of circumstances has emerged, with the 1995 Presidential elections as the logical starting point.
Up until then, there had been little or no consultation between the political elite and the general population on this question. The belief, commonly described as the 'permissive consensus' (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) , was that widespread acceptance of the European project characterised the general view of the French (and general EU) population with much support for the French lead on its development and progression (Schmidt 2007 (Schmidt , 999-1001 .
However, François Mitterrand's decision to ratify the Maastricht Treaty via a referendum in 1992 cast doubt on this assumption and revealed how the European question was far from consensual (Drake 2008, 197-98; Flood 2005, 43; Hurrelmann 2007, 352) . The postMaastricht era would see the 'permissive consensus' replaced by what has been described as a 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe and Marks 2008) . Europe, it is argued, has since then featured much more prominently on national political agendas as it has moved away from its status as the preserve of the mainstream elite. Despite this shift, the European question appears to have remained no more than an issue of secondary concern in successive election campaigns to France's highest office. The three Presidential elections of 1995, 2002 and 2007 will be briefly analysed to demonstrate and explain how this period saw the European issue become an increasingly important, difficult, yet hidden, campaign theme. 2012 is then presented as a game-changing election signalling an important shift in how Europe featured.
It will be concluded that Europe is now here to stay as a prominent issue in Presidential election campaigns, reflecting its position as an unavoidable area of importance. The article will draw on material from speeches, manifestos, media appearances and polling data.
1995-2007: The European Elephant
The 1995 elections were not only significant because they would turn the page on the Mitterrand era. They were equally the first post-Maastricht Presidential elections. This was significant for two reasons. Firstly, the successful ratification of the Maastricht treaty and its overwhelming backing by the bulk of France's mainstream politicians marked a significant step forward for the European project. As a result, the presence of Europe was set to weigh more heavily in the lives of the entire French population for years to come (Johnson 1997, 260-1) . Secondly, despite OUI victory, the referendum sparked considerable debate in France and exposed clear divisions over the issue amongst the electorate as well as within and between political parties Milner 2000, 35-6) . One would therefore have been forgiven for assuming that Europe's prominence as an election theme would increase accordingly. However, an examination of the 1995 campaign reveals that this did not materialise, with a 'conspicuous absence of a serious discussion on Europe' (Mazey 1995, 146; Ross 2000, 96-97; Flood 2005, 58) amongst candidates and only secondary importance afforded the issue in opinion polls. 1 This paradoxical set of circumstances can be explained by the fact that the growing doubts and fears, as exposed by the Maastricht referendum debate, coupled with the continued consensus amongst the mainstream political elite over the advancement of the European project (Tiersky 1995, 116-19) meant that the interests of the main candidates were best served by avoiding this difficult issue.
By the time of the 2002 Presidential elections, the progress of the European project had continued unabated, perhaps most symbolically represented with the introduction of the Euro in January of the election year. With such developments came increasing doubts, fears and mounting Euroscepticism (Flood 2005, 42-63) . Whilst President Chirac undoubtedly picked up the pro-European baton from his predecessor, there was an evident dampening in enthusiasm emanating from l'Elysée, perhaps reflective of the doubts amongst the electorate.
This was no more evident than in the changing nature of the Franco-German axis. (Boussat 2006, 187-212 In summary, the discrepancy between the importance of Europe and its marginalisation in Presidential election campaigns must be understood through the optic of widespread growing disenchantment that had seen the emergence of a growing gulf between political elites and their general populations (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015, 710-11 Let us now turn our attention to the 2012 election as a game-changer in terms of how the European question featured.
Presidentials 2012 -game changer
Nicolas Sarkozy was elected in 2007 on a rupture ticket, vowing to tackle the difficult reforms he deemed necessary to help France adapt to the demands of the 21 st century global economy (Hewlett 2007, 407-10) . His hyperpresident approach to reforms such as the pension regime combined with his inimitable Presidential style soon led to a crisis in terms of his popularity (Cole 2012, 312-14; Europe face up to the crisis and prepare for the worst consequences it had to offer. His strategy was clearly to present himself as the candidate who needed to remain in post in order to see through the long-term plan he was responsible for putting in place. 
The Campaign -First round

30
The now traditional, and arguably pivotal, TV debate between the candidates took place on 2 May and, unsurprisingly, the marathon 3-hour session saw a broad range of issues discussed. 31 There was no direct discussion of the European question. However, its importance in transcending a number of issues was evident throughout. Whilst the proEuropean stance of both candidates may help explain why it did not feature more specifically, that is not say there were no differences on the subject. Inevitably, the crisis brought the discussion on Europe to the 
Hollande voters
Sarkozy voters
On first view, it would appear that Europe remained very much a secondary concern for both Sarkozy and Hollande supporters. Nevertheless, that it featured at all could lend weight to the assessment that Europe was beginning to emerge as a more significant area of concern, interestingly more so for those having voted Sarkozy. Another voting day poll by
Opinionway asked respondents to identify the questions that counted most in their second round choices. 35 La Construction Européenne garnered a significant 21% but still lagged behind the same domestic issues given priority in round one. A TNS Sofres poll on the same day presented results to a very similar question where Europe was not even mentioned and la Situation Internationale received on 10%. 36 Such an absence for Europe was identifiable in an IPSOS rolling poll in the period leading up to the second round vote. 37 Respondents were asked to identify 3 areas that concerned them most from a personal perspective and also for France more generally. Neither set of results received any explicit reference to Europe . On the surface it would appear that Europe was not of any serious concern to the French electorate in 2012. There certainly appears to have been a significant gap between the electorate and the main candidates in relation to the question of Europe and its importance.
This ambiguity helps explain Drake's analysis of the European issue being 'everywhere and nowhere' during the campaign (Drake 2013 ). The following section provides an explanation for this paradoxical set of circumstances and explains why 2012 should nevertheless be considered a game-changer in relation to this question.
Making sense
The first point to make relates to the fact that in all Presidential elections prior to, and including, 2012, polling data has revealed Europe to be little more than a secondary consideration for the electorate. It is undeniable that Europe has consistently featured well down the list of declared priorities. However, one must be careful not to draw over-simplistic conclusions. Whilst it may well be the case that Europe has not featured in explicit terms, it is impossible to dissociate those themes that have been most prominent from the question of Europe. As the years have passed and the European project has progressed, it has become an undeniably prominent feature in the way in which France functions (Schmidt 2007, 995-98 henceforth follow a very strong pro-European trajectory and from that point on everyone seemingly bought into the project (Boussat 182) . So central has Europe become since then that it could argued as more of a domestic than a foreign policy issue (Rowdybush and Chamorel 2011, 170) . The fact that it is viewed in this manner goes some way towards explaining how and why it has never really featured explicitly as a separate issue of importance for the electorate, as borne out by the polling data. The counter-intuitive consequence that has seen the increased salience of Europe find no replication in its perceived prominence as a principle concern for the electorate (Dehousse and Tacea, 152) can in part be explained by the fact that its significance has been hidden by the conflation between Europe and key domestic issues such as unemployment, economy, immigration, etc. (Kramer 2006, 126-38; , Rozenberg 2015 -became an extremely difficult line to toe in the wake of the financial crisis. As the Euro emerged as the greatest victim of the depression, the feeling spread that France was being further dragged into the mire as a result. This was pounced upon by eurosceptics and in particular the FN who sought to exploit the crisis and place it front and centre in their own campaign. 39 The central argument that
Europe could be a shield to protect France from the vicissitudes of globalisation became a very difficult one to support when this US-born crisis stood to cripple the French economy (for some) because of French membership of the EU. 40 The context of the crisis therefore forced the 'constraining dissensus' onto the Presidential election agenda. As a result, the debate over Europe was no longer the preserve of extreme, populist parties on the Left and Right and mainstream candidates were left with little choice but to engage with Europe as a central issue. The fourth and final point relates to the subsequent breakdown in the 'rhetoric of unanimity'. The hitherto dominant consensus between the mainstream candidates over the advancement and direction of the European project that had been so central during the eras of the 'permissive consensus' and 'constraining dissensus' also broke down as a result of the crisis. The two main candidates, whilst both adamant pro-Europeans, argued for two very different responses to the crisis. On the one hand, Sarkozy insisted on the continuity of his austerity-driven programme whereas Hollande called for a new anti-austerity direction focused on growth. Such differentiation meant that for the first time there was some political capital to be gained in both camps in making more of Europe as a key election theme.
Prior to 2012, the evasive approach of Presidential candidates that had seen Europe pushed to the margins of campaign debates reflected the 'silent Europeanisation' experienced in France in spite of mounting fears, doubts and opposition (Rozenberg 2011(b) , 11).
However, in the run-up to the 2012 campaign, a number of factors converged to ensure that any hope of Europe continuing as an unspoken issue would be impossible. The build-up in tension finally broke through as a result of the convergence between Sarkozy's Europeanised
Presidency and the onset of the financial crisis. The subsequent prioritisation of Europe and its now flagrant and undeniable importance to, and influence on, domestic, French issues meant that it was no longer possible for it to be relegated to an issue of secondary importance.
Conclusion
The shift in election campaign coverage afforded to the issue of Europe in 2012 is important in signalling an irreversible change in how it will feature in future Presidential elections, starting in 2017. With Europe now placed as a central concern for candidates, the proverbial cat has been let out of the bag and it is difficult to see how this can be undone. Furthermore, it was argued earlier that a number of convergent factors came together to essentially force candidates to move away from the evasive treatment of the European question that hitherto had been so dominant. Central to such concerns were the shifting contextual circumstances of the financial crisis that made it virtually impossible to push any consideration of Europe's influence or importance to the margins of the campaign debate. Given the events of the 2012-17 period -the migrant crisis, the threat of terrorism, ongoing economic difficulties, the Brexit controversy, Hollande's failure to deliver on his anti-austerity rhetoric and the growing support for the FN and its Eurosceptic stance -, it is obvious that Europe will remain an area of unavoidable and principal concern for all candidates in the 2017 Presidential elections.
One only has to consider the attention afforded to the European question in the all-important primaries on the Left and the Right as an early indicator of just how significant Europe has become and will continue to be. 41 The increased salience as dictated by recent contextual developments will not be without consequence on the priorities of the electorate. Whilst it is unlikely to bypass the traditional dominant concerns (unemployment, spending power and immigration), there is a distinct possibility that Europe as an explicit (as well as implicit)
theme of concern will feature much more prominently in the list of priorities determining voters' choices in 2017. This will undoubtedly force candidates to afford Europe even more attention. Such a symbiotic process will see Europe progressively become increasingly
